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Abstract
In the present paper, the decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation (asking whether or not a
given Hamiltonian operator has the nonempty solution set) is represented as a logical statement.
As it is shown in the paper, the law of excluded middle would be applicable to the introduced
statement if and only if quantum fundamentalism (asserting that everything in the universe
is ultimately describable in quantum-mechanical terms) held. But, since the decision problem
of the Schro¨dinger equation is in general undecidable, such a statement is allowed to be other
than true or false, explicitly, it may fail to have truth values at all. This makes possible to
abandon the law of excluded middle together with quantum fundamentalism in the proposed
intuitionistic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Keywords: Intuitionistic logic, Constructivism, Law of excluded middle, Schro¨dinger equation,
Copenhagen interpretation, Decidability, Decoherence, Counterfactual definiteness, Hypercom-
puting, Many-world interpretation.
1 Introduction
There is a striking similarity between intuitionistic logic (i.e., a form of constructivism – a philoso-
phy of mathematics characterized by the requirement that when a mathematical object is asserted
to exist, positive evidence witnessing its truth should be given) and the Copenhagen interpretation
of quantum mechanics.
Really, unlike classical logic, where either a statement p or its negation ¬p must be true regardless
of whether one has positive evidence for either p or ¬p, in intuitionistic logic, statements are as-
signed a truth value only if they can be given a direct proof. Therewithal, unproved statements do
not have any intermediate logical value so that their relation to truth remains unknown until they
are either proved or disproved. 1
Now, compare that to the Copenhagen-based explanation of the quantum interference experiment,
in which an electron beam passing through a plate pierced by two parallel symmetrically positioned
∗Email : arkadyv@bgu.ac.il
1Introductory texts on intuitionistic logic and constructivism can be found, e.g., in [1, 2, 3].
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slits is observed on a screen behind the plate. According to this explanation, a sentence like “be-
fore being absorbed at the screen an electron went through either slit 1 or slit 2” has no meaning
unless an experiment is performed that decides through which particular slit the electron goes. 2
Only when there is a piece of apparatus that is capable of deciding which statement is true: the
statement p that the electron goes through slit 1 or the statement ¬p that the electron goes through
slit 2, it is permissible to say the electron went through either slit. Without such an apparatus, i.e.,
without positive evidence, one may not assign a truth value to the statements p and ¬p. If one,
nevertheless, does this, i.e., if one assumes that since the “middle” statement is excluded by logic,
the disjunction p ∨ ¬p is always true, and starts to make any deductions from that assumption,
errors will be made in the analysis. In Feynman’s words, “This is the logical [to be more specific,
intuitionistic – A.B.] tightrope on which we must walk if we wish to describe nature successfully.”[4]
Likewise, the Copenhagen interpretation leaves open the nature of the electron between the source
and the screen, so that it cannot ask itself the question about whether this nature is point-like or
not-point-like. This means that between the source and the screen statements like “the electron is a
particle” (statement p) and “the electron is a wave” (statement ¬p) are unproved and hence remain
of unknown truth value. And only by placing detectors directly behind the slits (in this way getting
positive evidence supporting the correctness of either p or ¬p and as a result the truthfulness of
p ∨ ¬p) these statements can be valuated.
The attentive reader may enquire is there more to this similarity between intuitionism and Copen-
hagen interpretation than just a coincidence? Is it, for example, possible that quantum phenomena
appear mysterious to us only because we try to apply to them the law of the excluded middle?
If so, puzzles of quantum mechanics might be dissolved once intuitionistic logic was adopted in
quantum theory.
The problem, however, is that the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics sooner demon-
strates the failure of the distributive law of propositional logic than the breakdown of the law of
the excluded middle, and in this way quantum formalism would rather advocate the adoption of
quantum logic than intuitionistic logic. 3 As a result, it is still unclear whether a consistent intu-
itionistic (or any constructivist for that matter) interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible.
Although attempts have been made to analyze different aspects of the foundations of quantum
mechanics within Bishop’s constructive mathematics (equivalent to mathematics done with in-
tuitionistic logic) and to find constructive substitutes of quantum formalism (see, for example,
[6, 7, 8]), those substitutes have never become sufficient for developing a full intuitionistic counter-
part of quantum mechanics.
Strictly speaking, the task of developing such a counterpart involves finding a correspondence be-
2Here it is assumed that there is no other way the electron emitted from the source can hit the screen except going
through the slits.
3But comparing intuitionistic logic with the traditional quantum logic (of Birkhoff and von Neumann), one can
easily notice the superiority of the former. As it has been elegantly put in the paper [5], quantum logic is “too
radical in giving up distributivity (for one thing rendering it problematic is to interpret the logical operations ∧ and
∨ as conjunction and disjunction, respectively)” at the same time as it is “not radical enough in keeping the law of
excluded middle (so that it falls victim to Schro¨dinger’s cat and the like)”.
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tween logical propositions and mathematical objects of quantum formalism such that these mathe-
matical objects together form the structure of a Heyting algebra, i.e., the formal algebraic structure
of intuitionistic logic. 4
Usually in quantum physics, a proposition is written in the form (A ∈ △a), where a ∈ R is a value
of an observable A and △a is a subset of R, so that (A ∈ △a) can be understood as the assertion
that the value of A is in the subset △a. Accordingly, in the event of an actual measurement of the
observable A, the proposition (A ∈ △a) may become determined affirmatively and, correspond-
ingly, its negation ¬(A ∈ △a) ≡ (A 6∈ △a) may be determined negatively. However, in the case of a
measurement of another, incompatible observable B (such that AB 6= BA ), the logical disjunction
(A ∈ △a) ∨ ¬(A ∈ △a) will have no meaning, that is, it will be neither true nor false (until the
subsequent measurement of the observable A will prove it).
Thus, what it is considered true strongly depends on the measurement context. However, propo-
sitions are specified without referring to the measurement context (given that such an external
information is not contained in the standard quantum formalism). So, this could be seen as an
explanation of why it is not possible to unambiguously associate propositions with subsets of the
Hilbert space [10].
As it is shown in [5], if one adopts a richer structure, which is capable of accounting for measuring
contexts, like a topos (an algebraic structure in category theory that behaves much like the category
Sets of sets except that all proofs in it have to be constructive [11]), then it becomes possible to
construct a Heyting algebra to obtain an intuitionistic quantum logic for systems associated with a
finite-dimensional Hilbert space. But even granting that, not only is the topos-theoretical approach
a very abstract one from a mathematical point of view, but it also brings about propositions that
have no meaning from a physical point of view. In consequence, it is difficult to find a physical
interpretation of the logic obtained by such an approach.
So, in the present paper, another, completely different way for ‘constructivization’ of quantum
mechanics is proposed. Namely, to formulate an intuitionistic interpretation of quantum mechanics
it is proposed to revise the assumption of the universal validity of Schro¨dinger dynamics adopted
in quantum mechanics (specifically, in the decoherent-based versions of the Copenhagen interpre-
tation).
4A Heyting algebra is a bounded lattice, i.e., an algebraic structure of the form (L,∧,∨,⊤,⊥) consisting of a
set L, two binary operations ∧ and ∨, and the top and bottom elements denoted as ⊤ (“true”) and ⊥ (“false”),
respectively. A Heyting algebra is a proper generalization of the notion of a Boolean algebra, namely, every Boolean
algebra is a Heyting algebra and a Heyting algebra is Boolean if and only if ¬¬ p = p for all p ∈ L [9].
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2 The decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation
Let |u〉 – an element of an abstract (complex) vector space U – represent the exact solution 5 to
the general, time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation describing how the quantum state of a physical
system S changes with time
i~
∂
∂t
|u〉 = HS |u〉 , (1)
where HS symbolizes the Hamiltonian operator identified with the system S, while time t is a
parameter ranging over the set of all real numbers R. The general equation (1) can be viewed as
the function problem formulated as follows:
Given an explicit expression for the Hamiltonian operator HS, find all solutions |u〉 to
the equation resulted from the insertion of this expression into the general Schro¨dinger
equation or decide that no such solution exists.
The corresponding decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation can be then defined as the logical
statement Πu(HS), which is taken to be true if the solution set {|u〉}, i.e., the set of all |u〉 for
which the Schro¨dinger equation with the particular Hamiltonian operator HS holds, is not empty
and false otherwise, i.e. 6
Πu(HS) ≡
(∣∣∣∣
{
|u〉 ∈ U
∣∣∣ i~ ∂
∂t
|u〉 = HS|u〉
}∣∣∣∣ > 0
)
. (2)
Let the domain of discourse of all allowable Hamiltonian operators HS be denoted by H, then the
assertion of the universality of Schro¨dinger dynamics can be abbreviated as the following statement:
∀HS ∈ H
(
Πu(HS)
)
. (3)
5Even though a general, mathematically rigorous definition of “exact solution” is difficult enough to outline (since
such a definition should, on the one hand, possess a certain heuristic value giving one a chance to apply a mathematical
formalism but, on the other hand, have a clear physical meaning – see on this subject, for example, [12]), for the
purpose of this paper, by “the exact solution |u〉” one can understand either the analytic (algebraic) expression for
|u〉 explicitly presented in terms of some previously known functions or the exact algorithm for calculating numerical
values of |u〉 to an arbitrary precision.
6In this paper, “statements” and “propositions” are synonymous and so they are used interchangeably, despite
the fact that from the point of view of philosophy and theoretical linguistics there is some distinction between them.
Particularly, propositions admit multiple representations, while statements are their representations [13].
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For example, this statement will be affirmatively determined if there is a witness, which provides
a proof that Πu(HS) is true given any allowable Hamiltonian operator HS .
7
Let |ψ〉, |φ〉 and |ϕ〉 be system’s pure arbitrary quantum states represented by vectors (state vectors)
in the Hilbert space HS associated with the system S. Consider the following claim:
The system in any pure quantum state |ψ〉 can be regarded as being partly in each of two
other pure quantum states |φ〉 and |ϕ〉 such that |ψ〉 = α |φ〉 + β |ϕ〉 where the complex
coefficients α and β must satisfy the normalization condition α2 + β2 = 1.
This claim can be shorten to the equivalent denoted by Cψ(HS):
Cψ(HS) ≡ ∀ |ψ〉, |φ〉, |ϕ〉 ∈ HS ∀α, β ∈ C
(
|ψ〉 = α |φ〉+ β |ϕ〉 ∧ α2 + β2 = 1
)
. (4)
Suppose the domain of discourse specifying all possible Hilbert spaces HS , which are associated
with physical systems, to be referred to as H (this domain H can be thought of as a subset of
abstract complete inner product vector spaces that meet physical constraints); then, the statement
of the universality of the quantum superposition principle can be expressed as follows:
∀HS ∈ H
(
Cψ(HS)
)
. (5)
This statement will have a definite true value, say “true”, if there is a witness which proves the
truthfulness of Cψ(HS) for any allowed Hilbert space HS .
Using the expressions (3) and (5), the assumption of the universal applicability of quantum me-
chanics can be formulated as the logical conjunction
AQ ≡ ∀HS ∈ H ∀HS ∈ H
(
Πu(HS) ∧ Cψ(HS)
)
(6)
that is true when there is a witness, which, given any arbitrary physical system S specified in the
form of its Hamiltonian operator HS and its associated Hilbert space HS as input, provides positive
evidence supporting both Πu(HS) and Cψ(HS) (i.e., validity of both Schro¨dinger dynamics and the
quantum superposition principle for this system). Oppositely, to prove the negation ¬AQ of this
assumption, i.e.
¬AQ = ∃HS ∈ H ∃HS ∈ H
(
¬Πu(HS) ∨ ¬Cψ(HS)
)
, (7)
7Here and hereinafter, the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation of logical connectives and quanti-
fiers is used [14].
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a witness demonstrating contradictory of either Πu(HS) or Cψ(HS) must be provided for at least
one physical system S.
In contrast with the constructivist point of view (according to which knowing that a statement is
true means having a proof of it), in the modern versions of the Copenhagen interpretation, i.e.,
ones that include decoherent-based explanations of the appearance of wavefunction collapse, it is
assumed – notwithstanding the absence of direct proof – that the formalism of quantum mechanics
can be extrapolated from the level of single electrons and atoms (where one actually can find satis-
factory evidence that this formalism is quantitatively valid) up to the level of macroscopic systems
(such as observers and their measurement devices) and even up to the level of the universe as a
whole.
Therewith, the motive for such an extrapolation is this: As there is no experimental evidence that
quantum mechanics is not valid in the regions where it has not been directly tested, the principle
of Occam’s razor would certainly suggest that the most intellectually economical attitude in this
situation is to consider that the assumption of the universal applicability of quantum mechanics
AQ is true [15].
But in fact, this ‘intellectually economical’ attitude mirrors the proof by contradiction of classical
logic. Indeed, according to the reasoning behind the extrapolation of quantum formalism, the lack
of evidence that the assumption AQ is wrong must imply that the assumption AQ is true, which
can be formulated as the double negation elimination, i.e.
¬¬AQ → AQ . (8)
Recall that unlike Πu(HS), the statement Cψ(HS) has no existential components in its definition 8
and so the witness to Cψ(HS) has nothing decidedly nontrivial to do, which means that Cψ(HS)
can be treated classically: ¬¬Cψ(HS) → Cψ(HS). Consequently, in order to prove the negation
elimination (8), the proof of the following negation elimination is necessary
∀HS ∈ H
(
¬¬Πu(HS)→ Πu(HS)
)
. (9)
However, the latter holds only if the decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation is decidable, that
is to say, if the statement Πu (HS) can be assigned a definite truth value (one of the two element
set B = {⊤,⊥}) such that the following statement of excluded middle always holds true:
∀HS ∈ H
(
Πu(HS) ∨ ¬Πu(HS)
)
= ⊤ . (10)
8Bearing in mind that the existential quantifier symbol ∃ can be interpreted as “it is a set”, the statement Πu(HS)
is logically equivalent to the assertion ∃ |u〉 ∈ U P (|u〉, t,HS), where P (|u〉, t,HS) is the predicate “i~
∂
∂t
|u〉 = HS|u〉”.
6
In its turn, this statement can be proved only if the decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation
can be solved by an effective decision procedure, i.e., by an algorithm.
At the moment, besides a brute-force method (aka exhaustive search or direct search that sequen-
tially tests each possibility – i.e., a candidate solution – in order to determine whether or not it
belongs to the solution set {|u〉}), there is no other procedure, which can solve the decision problem
of the Schro¨dinger equation for any allowable Hamiltonian operator HS .
9
As to brute-force, however, even though this general method can always find the correct solution
set {|u〉} or prove that it is empty, its computational cost (e.g., a number of steps required to do
so) is proportional to the number of candidate solutions for {|u〉} which tends to grow very quickly
as the size of the list of amplitudes describing the quantum state of the system increases. So, when
this list is infinite (just as in the case of a particle on a lattice that can be in any one of infinitely
many discrete positions), the computational cost of the brute-force method may rise to an infinity.
As a result, there does not exist a single (i.e., a generic) effective method that can in a finite
amount of steps correctly solve the decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation for all allowable
Hamiltonian operators HS . Thus, one must admit (at least in the present state of the knowledge)
that the statement Πu(HS) is in general undecidable.
10
Even so, the decoherent-based interpretations of quantum mechanics are based upon the supposi-
tion declaring
Schro¨dinger dynamics is universally valid,
which can be written down in formal terms as the following propositional formula
∀HS ∈ H Πu(HS) = ⊤ , (11)
9See, for example, the book [16] that focuses on non-mainstream methods to solve the molecular electronic
Schro¨dinger equation and discusses whether a truly predictive computational scheme other than built on brute force
would be ever possible in quantum chemistry.
10The decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation is parallel to the general spectral gap problem (the central one
in quantum many-body physics) that asks whether or not a given Hamiltonian operator HS has a spectral gap, i.e.
the energy difference between the ground state and the first excited state of the system in the thermodynamic limit.
Truly, if there were a generic algorithm capable of obtaining the solution set {|u〉} of the Schro¨dinger equation for
any allowable Hamiltonian operator HS, then such an algorithm would be able to not only valuate the statement
Πu(HS), but also answer the question whether the spectrum of the resultant eigenvalues is discrete and gapped or
continuous and gapless. On the other hand, as it is demonstrated in the paper [17], when the allowable expressions
for the Hamiltonian operator HS in the Schro¨dinger equation are restricted to translationally invariant ones given
by nearest neighbor interactions on a 2D lattice, there cannot exist any procedure which, given the matrix elements
of the local interactions of the Hamiltonian HS, determines whether the resulting spectrum of states is gapped or
gapless. This implies that the general spectral gap problem is undecidable. But what is more, one can infer from
this that the generic algorithm for solving the decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation cannot exist as well.
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where symbol “=” defines the notion of a valuation; specifically, the formula (11) assigns the truth
value ⊤ (or the meaning of “true”) to every statement Πu(HS) in the entire domain H of allow-
able Hamiltonian operators HS. This propositional formula is logically equivalent to the postulate
asserting
All Schro¨dinger equations are exactly solvable.
On the other hand, in view of the linearity of the Schro¨dinger equation, the formula (11) implies
that superpositions of quantum states of any physical system – including, for example, the system
consisting of the silver atom plus the measuring apparatus in the Stern-Gerlach experiment – can
be solutions of the Schro¨dinger equation. As a result, there ought to be superpositions in the
measurement outcomes, i.e., at the macroscopic level (for example, there should be a superposition
state of the atom plus apparatus in which apparatus pointers are in various positions at the same
time). Clearly, this contradicts ordinary experience which is the essence of the (in)famous mea-
surement problem of quantum mechanics.
As it is well known, decoherence per se does not constitute an adequate answer to the measure-
ment problem, 11 therefore, responses to this problem have been sought by invoking additional
assumptions such as observer-induced collapse, many worlds, hidden variables, modified dynam-
ics, transactional “handshakes”, modal interpretations, just to name a few. However, explaining
why no quantum strangeness is seen in the measurement results all those assumptions clearly or
arguably go beyond the standard quantum formalism. More importantly, none of them is widely
believed to be free of accompanying conceptual problems [21].
So, in order to resolve the measurement problem it seems necessary to refuse to recognize the
statement of excluded middle Πu(HS)∨¬Πu(HS) as being always true, which causes this problem
in the first place.
Really, by treating the statement of the universal validity of Schro¨dinger dynamics as a truthful
one – which is only possible if Πu(HS)∨¬Πu(HS) is a logical truth – one endows macroscopic
systems with new features such as macroscopic quantum superposition states. And upon doing so,
one creates a paradox, which requires new theories for its explanation.
3 The intuitionistic interpretation of quantum mechanics
But instead, let us consider an intuitionistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the
statement of excluded middle Πu(HS)∨¬Πu(HS) can still be proved for some systems, however,
this statement does not hold universally (as it does in the decoherent-based Copenhagen interpre-
tations).
11Decoherence is only a way to show why no macroscopic superposed state can be observed, whereas the quantum
entanglement between the atom, the apparatus and the environment never disappears. See, for example, [18, 19, 20]
for the discussion concerning decoherence and further references.
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More specifically, let us consider an interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is based on intu-
itionistic (constructive) logic and the supposition that there is no generic solution to the decision
problem of the Schro¨dinger equation working in all cases of the Hamiltonian operator HS (despite
the fact that there may be solutions that work in some cases). Accordingly, for an arbitrary phys-
ical system S, the statement Πu(HS) will be neither true nor false unless one has a proof of this
statement.
3.1 The main assumption
The main assumption of the proposed intuitionistic interpretation can be expressed in the form of
the following assertion:
Schro¨dinger dynamics is possibly valid.
With the modal operator of possibility ♦, this assertion can be formally written down as the formula
♦Πu(HS) = ⊤ , (12)
which assigns the truth value ⊤ to the proposition “it is possible that Πu(HS)”. 12 This assumption
is logically equivalent to the postulate asserting
There might be exactly solvable Schro¨dinger equations.
As a consequence of the assumption (12), it follows that there may be physical systems for which
the formula Πu(HS)∨¬Πu(HS) is not true. Indeed, using the modal operator of necessity  and
the analogy of de Morgan’s laws ¬♦p ↔ ¬p, one can write the negation of the assumption (12)
as the following propositional expression
¬Πu(HS) = ⊥ , (13)
which states
Not-Schro¨dinger dynamics is impossible (i.e., not possibly valid).
12Many aspects of modal logic are covered in [22].
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Making use of the characteristic axiom of modal logic (¬p = ⊥)→ (¬p = ⊥) (that reads “if not-p
is impossible, then not-p is not the case” [23]), one can get that the logical disjunction on values
of two statements ♦Πu(HS) and ¬Πu(HS) is always true:
♦Πu(HS) ∨ ¬Πu(HS) = ⊤ . (14)
Now, let us go back to the assumption (12): Assigning the “true” value to the possibility that
the statement Πu(HS) is true makes Πu(HS) contingent because its actual truth value remains
unsettled. 13 Surely, since Πu(HS) → ♦Πu(HS) and not vice versa, the valuation ♦Πu(HS) = ⊤
does not entail the truthfulness of Πu (HS).
14 In this way, the disjunction (14) indicates that for
some systems the law of excluded middle would not hold, i.e.:
∃HS ∈ H
(
Πu(HS) ∨ ¬Πu(HS)
)
6= ⊤ (15)
(where the existential introduction p(HS′) → ∃HS ∈ H p(HS) is assumed). From a mathemat-
ical point of view, this attests an intuitionistic logic of the proposed interpretation of quantum
mechanics. 15
Thus, contrary to the decoherent-based interpretations of quantum mechanics, the proposed inter-
pretation limits the applicability of the quantum mechanical description only to those systems for
which the statement Πu(HS) can be affirmed explicitly, that is, can be valuated positively by an
arithmetical or recursive procedure in a finite number of steps, i.e., by an algorithm. 16
3.2 Turing-computability
From a computational theoretical perspective, the statement Πu(HS) might be Turing-computable
if the Hilbert space HS associated with the system S were finite-dimensional or it were capable of
being safely approximated by a finite-dimensional vector space CN ≃ {|n〉}Nn=1 ⊂ HS .
13Since the negation of the statement Πu(HS) has no existential components (see footnote 8), it can be treated
classically: in particular, the negation ¬Πu(HS) is assumed to be false. But despite that, the statement Πu(HS)
itself cannot be asserted since it has not been proved yet.
14Such a difference is strictly due to the accepted supposition that there does not exist a generic algorithm for
solving the decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation. If this problem were universally solvable, one would have
Πu(HS)→ ♦Πu(HS) and ♦Πu(HS)→ Πu(HS).
15Formally speaking, this means that the statement Πu(HS) is an element of a Heyting algebra.
16Yet, in some cases, the statement Πu(HS) can be proved without an algorithm that solves it. According to the
Church-Turing thesis (CTT), any function that is computable is computable by some Turing machine [24]; hence,
the statement Πu(HS) is provable when it is Turing-computable. On the other hand, according to the Physical CTT,
any physical process (i.e., anything doable by a physical system) is computable by some Turing machine [25]. Thus,
a witness, which provides a proof that Πu(HS) is true, can be physically implemented i.e., realized physically. In
other words, this witness can be a physical process (e.g., the Stern-Gerlach experiment) empirically demonstrating
that Schro¨dinger dynamics is valid for a particular system.
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In more detail, an arbitrary pure quantum state |Ψ〉 of the system S can be presented by the equation
|Ψ〉 =
N∑
n=1
Ψn|n〉+X∞|Ψ〉 , (16)
where {Ψn ≡ 〈n|Ψ〉}Nn=1 is the list of complex amplitudes describing the quantum state |Ψ〉 and X∞
is the projector onto the reminder of the system’s infinite Hilbert space HS, that is, on the relative
complement HS \ CN . In the case, in which the component X∞|Ψ〉 could be safely neglected, the
number of candidate solutions for the solution set {|u〉} might be limited. This suggests that in this
case the statement Πu(HS) might be proved in a finite number of steps by at least a brute-force
method. 17
Then again, if the replacement of an infinite Hilbert space HS by a finite dimensional vector space
C
N were impossible to justify, then the statement Πu(HS) would be undecidable which would make
the quantum mechanical description of the system S inapplicable.
Take, for example a typical microscopic system consisting of one or a few isolated subatomic parti-
cles moving at less than a relativistic velocity in a confined area and involving only limited energies
(similar to energies of electrons in an atom or a solid). For this system, one can safely assume
a discrete spectrum of energies, which is upper limited by some finite level, and in that way one
can restrict the orthonormal basis of the infinite Hilbert space to some truncated basis {|n〉}Nn=1.
Because of this, for such a system, the decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation has the possi-
bility of being solvable (e.g., by a brute force method) and consequently the quantum mechanical
description may be applicable. 18
In opposition, a typical macroscopic system always interacts (even only weakly) with a large part
of the universe, or perhaps, with all of it. Therefore, most of the system’s degrees of freedom –
in particular the macroscopic ones – can vary continuously (i.e., in an unbroken series or pattern)
and in an unconfined, unbounded manner. Following this line of reasoning, one can remark that
any discretization of the system’s macroscopic degrees of freedom (in order to perform numerical
computations) would correspond to an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space for which a replacement
by a finite-dimensional numerical basis may not be vindicated. As a consequence, the decision
problem of the Schro¨dinger equation for a typical macroscopic system could not be solved by a
brute force method (as it would fail to halt). This implies that in the given case the statement
Πu(HS) would be undecidable, i.e., it would remain neither true nor false, making in this way the
quantum mechanical description of a typical macroscopic system irrelevant. 19
17This could be infeasible to achieve in practice, though, due to an exponential amount of steps required by the
brute force method.
18What’s more, for this (i.e., typical microscopic) system, quantum formalism turns out to be constructive (i.e.,
computable): Namely, in the truncated basis {|n〉}Nn=1 one would need only a finite number of steps in order to
construct (to any given precision) the matrix HS = (Hnn)
N
nn describing the Hamiltonian operator HS in a numerical
(computer) representation or to exhibit the wavefunction Ψ(x) = 〈x|Ψ〉 of the system.
19Furthermore, due to the equivalence of boundedness and continuity, unbounded linear Hermitian operators in an
infinite Hilbert space are discontinuous and thus generate Turing-noncomputability. This infers that the application
of quantum formalism to a typical macroscopic system would necessarily cause the existence of Turing-noncomputable
11
3.3 Heisenberg’s cut
So, a Heisenberg’s cut – i.e., an imagined demarcation line between the quantum mechanical and
classical descriptions – is determined in the proposed interpretation by the Turing computabil-
ity of the decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation. This may explain the basic difficulty that
quantum mechanics meets in locating the “shifty split” between quantum and classical phenomena.
First, neither mass, nor geometrical size nor any other physical characteristic can serve by itself
as a qualitative criterion for the Turing computability. Next, there is a liberty in choosing the
truncated basis {|n〉}Nn=1 (that approximates a computable representation of a system in which the
statement Πu(HS) might be provable/decidable) for an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space. Further-
more, any change to this truncated basis – for example, by the inclusion of a few more variables into
the quantum mechanical description of the system – can bring about a shift in the Heisenberg’s cut.
3.4 The von Neumann measurement scheme
The fact that the quantum mechanical description of an arbitrary macroscopic system could not
be considered constructive invalidates the von Neumann quantum measurement scheme.
As stated by the assumptions on which the von Neumann scheme is based, the measurement pro-
cess is governed by the Schro¨dinger equation for the Hamiltonian operator HS+M describing the
composite quantum system S+M which contains the measured microscopic system S and the mea-
suring macroscopic apparatus M devised to measure the observable A of the microscopic system
S (in order to facilitate this, the apparatus M supposedly has the ready-state |M0〉 and the set of
mutually orthogonal states {|Mn〉}, all orthogonal to |M0〉, corresponding to different macroscopic
configurations of M similar to different positions of a pointer along a scale). The linearity of the
Schro¨dinger equation yields the eigenvector-eigenvalue link – the perfect correlation between the
initial (i.e., at the moment t = 0 preceding the measurement) state |an〉 of the microsystem S and
the final (i.e., at the moment t in the last part of the measurement) state |Mn〉 of the apparatus
M , i.e.
|an〉|M0〉 −→ |Ψt〉 = |an〉|Mn〉 (17)
in such a way that if the final state of the apparatus is |Mn〉, then the observable A has the value an.
When the initial state of the microscopic system S is just one of the vectors |an〉 like in Eq.17, the
proposition
(and so nonconstructive) mathematical entities in the description of the system which cannot be regarded as experi-
mentally testable. See [26] and [27, 28] for the discussion concerning constructivism and computability in quantum
mechanics.
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(A = an) ≡
(
|an〉|Mn〉 = e
−itHS+M
~ |an〉|M0〉
)
(18)
contains no logical connectives such as ∨,→ and ∃, and therefore it demands no decidedly nontriv-
ial witness to its truthfulness. This means that the proposition (A = an) can be treated classically,
particularly, (A = an) ∨ (A 6= an) can be considered as an instance of the law of excluded middle.
However, in the situation, in which the initial state of the microsystem S is a superposition of the
vectors like |an〉, for example, |n+ k〉 = 1√
2
(|an〉+ |ak〉), and, as a consequence, the final state of
the system S +M is given by the macroscopic superposition
1√
2
(|an〉+ |ak〉)|M0〉 −→ |Ψt〉 = 1√
2
(|an〉|Mn〉+ |ak〉|Mk〉) , (19)
the law of excluded middle is not applicable, which constitutes a contradiction of the von Neumann
scheme that is built on the law of excluded middle.
Indeed, let us assume (for the sake of simplicity) that the observable A can only take on two values
an, ak and consider the proposition (A ∈ {an, ak}) asserting that there is a final state |Ψt〉 of the mi-
crosystem S + the apparatusM , in which the observable A has a definite value, i.e., either an or ak:
(A ∈ {an, ak}) ≡
(
|Ψt〉 = |an〉|Mn〉 ∨ |Ψt〉 = |ak〉|Mk〉
∣∣∣ |Ψt〉 = e−itHS+M~ |n+ k〉|M0〉
)
. (20)
According to classical logic (on which any measuring macroscopic apparatus is based), the propo-
sition (A ∈ {an, ak}) = (A = an) ∨ (A = ak) must be a logical truth. 20 But this contradicts to the
scheme of dynamical evolution presented in Eq.19, according to which the proposition (A ∈ {an, ak})
must be false: This scheme declares that the observable A may simultaneously have both values
an and ak, that is, (A = an) ∧ (A = ak) = ⊤.
The standard way out from this contradiction (while maintaining classical logic) is to supplement
the Schro¨dinger equation with the wave-packet reduction postulate, which states that at the end of
the measurement process the final state vector |Ψt〉 reduces to one of its terms: either |an〉|Mn〉 or
|ak〉|Mk〉 (thus making the proposition (A ∈ {an, ak}) true). 21
By contrast, intuitionistic logic (adopted in the proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics)
requires that if the proposition (A ∈ {an, ak}) is asserted to be true, then a witness proving its
20Here it is suggested that ¬ (A = an) = (A = ak) and correspondingly ¬ (A = ak) = (A = an).
21In the decoherent-based interpretations, the interaction with the environment produces essentially a randomiza-
tion of the phases associated to the different components of the final state vector, a process which can be seen as an
apparent collapse of this vector into one of these components [29].
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truthfulness must be given since it contains the logic operator ∨ of disjunction. 22 As it can be
seen from Eq.20, such a witness can be a solution to the Schro¨dinger equation for the Hamiltonian
HS+M when the input |Ψ0〉 = |n+ k〉|M0〉 is given.
On the other hand, according to the proposed intuitionistic interpretation, Schro¨dinger dynam-
ics is only possibly valid, and so ♦Πu(HM ) = ⊤, which implies that one has no guarantee that
the Schro¨dinger equation for the Hamiltonian operator HM describing an arbitrary macroscopic
apparatus M could be exactly solved. So (unless one has empirical evidence proving the validity
of Schro¨dinger dynamics for this particular apparatus M), the statement Πu(HM ) must stay on
contingent.
The undecidability of the statement Πu(HM ) implies that the ready-state |M0〉 ∈ CN ≃ {|Mn〉}Nn
where CN is the vector space over the mutually orthogonal quantum states |Mn〉 of the apparatus
M , could not be proven to exist. Hence, the predicate P (|Ψt〉) of the proposition (A ∈ {an, ak}),
which can be presented as
P (|Ψt〉) ≡
(
|Ψt〉 = e
−itHS+M
~ |Ψ0〉
)
∧
(
|n+ k〉
)
∧
(
|M0〉
)
, (21)
may not be algorithmically analyzed for its overall truth value since
(
|M0〉 ∈ CN
)
=
(
Πu(HM )
)
= {} , (22)
where the empty set {} represents “neither true nor false”. This means that the proposition
(A ∈ {an, ak}) cannot be decided computationally, and so without direct evidence (i.e., without a
result of the measurement of the observable A), one may not assign any truth value to the propo-
sition (A ∈ {an, ak}).
So, the undecidability of the proposition (A ∈ {an, ak}) discards the necessity of the reduction pos-
tulate in the measurement scheme: In the proposed intuitionistic interpretation, this proposition
does not transform from false to true during the measurement in consequence of the wave-packet
reduction, but merely remains neither false nor true (in this way rendering invalid Eq.19) till it is
shown to be true by an actual measurement result at the end of the measurement process. 23
22Besides, this proposition can be rewritten so that it will contain the existential quantification ∃ together with the
predicate variable |Ψt〉, which is the solution to the Schro¨dinger equation for the Hamiltonian HS+M : (A ∈ {an, ak}) ≡
∃ |Ψt〉 ∈ {|an〉|Mn〉 , |ak〉|Mk〉}P (|Ψt〉), where P (|Ψt〉) is the predicate enclosing this equation.
23The asymmetry of the proposition (A ∈ {an, ak}) can be attributable to the asymmetry of the statement
Πu(H(·)). Really, let us consider the negation of the predicate P (|Ψt〉): ¬P (|Ψt〉) = (¬(|Ψt〉 = e
(−itHS+M )/~ |Ψ0〉)) ∨
(¬ (|n+ k〉))∨(¬Πu(HM )). According to the main assumption of the proposed interpretation, not-Schro¨dinger dynam-
ics is impossible, which means that ¬(|Ψt〉=e
(−itHS+M)/~ |Ψ0〉)=⊥ and also ¬Πu(HM )=⊥. But since ¬ (|n+ k〉)=⊥
(due to the initial condition of the considered problem), one finds ¬P (|Ψt〉) = ⊥ and thus ¬ (A ∈ {an, ak}) = ⊥.
As a result, if (A ∈ {an, ak}) is decidable, that is, if (A ∈ {an, ak}) can be assigned a definite truth value, then
(A ∈ {an, ak}) = ⊤. One can observe from here that an actual measurement of the observable A may only prove the
truthfulness of the proposition (A ∈ {an, ak}).
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3.5 Counterfactuals in the intuitionistic interpretation
The undecidability of the decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation makes impossible to speak
meaningfully of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not been performed.
To show this, let us discuss the case in which two microsystems SA and SB , whose states are
determined by the observables A and B, respectively, taking only on the values a1, a2 and b1, b2,
are entangled before the measurement process so that at the moment t = 0 the states of these
microsystems are described by the entangled pure state |ψ0〉 (similar to one of four Bell states).
Let the composite (spatially separated bipartite) system governed by the Hamiltonian operator
HC have a source that emits pairs of the microsystems SA and SB occupying the entangled state
|ψ0〉 into two opposite directions, with the microsystem SA sent to destination where there is a
macroscopic apparatus MA devised to measure the observable A, and the microsystem SB sent to
the place of a macroscopic apparatus MB devised to measure the observable B.
Let us introduce the 2-tuple (A,B) of pairs of values of the observables A and B and consider the
following proposition
(
(A ∈ {a,¬a}) ∧ (B ∈ {b,¬b}) ) = ((A,B) ∈ {(a, b), (a,¬b), (¬a, b), (¬a,¬b)}) , (23)
where the following abbreviations are used: a = a1, ¬a = a2 and b = b1, ¬b = b2. This proposition
asserts that there is a final state of the considered composite system, in which the tuple (A,B) has
a definite value, that is:
(
(A ∈ {a,¬a}) ∧ (B ∈ {b,¬b}) )≡(|Ψt〉∈{|Ψi〉}4i=1
∣∣∣ |Ψt〉 = e−itHC~ |ψ0〉|MA0〉|MB0〉
)
, (24)
in which |Ψ1〉 = |a〉|b〉|Ma〉|Mb〉, |Ψ2〉 = |a〉|¬b〉|Ma〉|M¬b〉, and so on.
Thus, if the observable A were chosen to be measured and the proposition (A = a) were shown to
be true, then in any interpretation of quantum mechanics that adopts classical (or quantum) logic,
Eq.23 would be as follows:
(
(A = a) ∧ (B ∈ {b,¬b})
)
=
(
(A,B) ∈ {(a, {b,¬b}}) = ⊤ . (25)
This means that – no matter how far apart from each other the macroscopic apparatuses MA and
MB might be – a counterfactual measurement of the observable B must always be included to-
gether with the factual measurement of the observable A. In other words, in such interpretations
the statistical population describing observable A would contain two pairs (a, b) and (a,¬b) for
each possible value of B regardless of whether or not an actual measurement of the observable B
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has been performed. 24
In contrast to this, in the intuitionistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, the truth value of
the proposition ((A ∈ {a,¬a}) ∧ (B ∈ {b,¬b})) is computationally undecidable (as the statements
Πu(HMA) and Πu(HMB) are both undecidable if the apparatuses MA and MB are both typical
macroscopic systems). Consequently, this proposition could be assigned the truth value ⊤ only if
there were witnesses for both (A ∈ {a,¬a}) and (B ∈ {b,¬b}).
For example, assume, that the observable A has been chosen to be measured and shown to be equal
to a. This provides the witness for (A = a) = ⊤ but at the same time the proposition (B ∈ {b,¬b})
remains of unknown truth value, i.e., (B ∈ {b,¬b}) = {}, and hence in the place of Eq.23 one would
find
(
(A = a) ∧ {}
)
=
(
(A,B) ∈ {(a, {}}) = {} , (26)
which means that in the given case the statistical population describing observable A may only
contain the value a. 25
Consequently, the proposed intuitionistic interpretation rejects the possibility of reliable measure-
ments of the counterfactual and definite kind by making such a possibility logically invalid for
typical macroscopic systems.
4 Discussion
Let us very briefly examine possible arguments against the proposed intuitionistic interpretation
of quantum mechanics.
4.1 Approximate solutions of the Schro¨dinger equation
First, one can argue that the validity of quantum dynamics need not be associated with the exact
solvability of the Schro¨dinger equation. Accordingly, the relevance of quantum mechanical descrip-
tion to a particular system cannot be decided based only on the availability (or nonavailability) of
the exact solutions to the Schro¨dinger equation of this system.
24Suppose, for example, that the entangled state |ψ0〉 of the microsystems SA and SB has been prepared so that
the tuple (A,B) can only contain the ordered pairs of values of the observables A and B: (A,B) ∈ {(a, b), (¬a,¬b)}.
Next, if the observable A had been chosen to be measured and shown to be equal to a, i.e., (A = a) = ⊤, then
in accordance with the interpretations based on classical or quantum logic, the result obtained by the spatially
separated apparatus MB would be absolutely certain: B = b. And if at the place of the apparatus MB there was
another macroscopic apparatus MC devised to measure the incompatible observable C such that CB 6= BC, the
outcome of the measurement would be not certain even without disturbing the microsystem SB at all.
25Therewith, a correlation between results of the distant measurements of the observables A and B can only be
established when and where the data from both apparatuses MA and MB can be available.
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Yes, it is certainly true that many features of quantum mechanics can be drawn from the ap-
proximate solutions to the Schro¨dinger equation (e.g., in the limit when these solutions assume a
semiclassical form), but even so the applicability of quantum mechanics as a matter of principle
should be discussed only using the exact solutions.
This is so because the exact solutions to the Schro¨dinger equation play an extremely important
role in quantum physics [30]. Apart from being a training ground for elaborating various approx-
imate and qualitative methods and used as zeroth-order approximations for constructing various
perturbative schemes, these solutions are the only ones that describe actual physical reality (given,
of course, that the Schro¨dinger equation describes physical reality). Consequently, only such solu-
tions should be used for testing foundational hypotheses and assumptions of quantum mechanics.
Otherwise, i.e., in case approximate solutions of the Schro¨dinger equation are used for such a pur-
pose, this could lead to a conceptual confusion.
For example, asserting that quantum formalism is applicable even to Hyperion (one of the moons
of Saturn) and at the same time considering only approximate solutions to Schro¨dinger’s equation
governing the dynamics of this planetary object (e.g., the WKB approximation), one immediately
realizes that the approximate quantum description of Hyperion’s rotation will break down very
soon: As a result of chaotic evolution, after a short period of time Hyperion has to be (in accor-
dance with the given description) in an extremely non-classical state of rotation, in contrast to
what is observed (see details of this description in [31]).
So, to explain away such a discrepancy, the mechanism of decoherence is called as the practically
irreversible and practically unavoidable disappearance of certain phase relations from the quantum
state of Hyperion by interaction with its environment according to the Schro¨dinger equation. But
then again, this mechanism is asserted without computational evidence demonstrating the truth of
the proposition that the quantum state of Hyperion exists in the first place, i.e., without finding
first the set of all exact solutions of the Schro¨dinger equation for Hyperion.
Meanwhile, if one were to accept that there is no algorithm for finding the solution set of the
Schro¨dinger equation for an arbitrary system, then one would agree that the proposition of the
existence of the quantum state of Hyperion has no proof. Hence, this proposition together with
the resulting conclusion of the loss of quantum predictability of Hyperion’s movement are neither
true nor false, which implies that treating Hyperion quantum mechanically has no meaning. 26
4.2 Super-Turing computability
Second, one can object that the provability of the statement Πu(HS) is controlled by its Turing-
computability. For admitting models of computation known as hypercomputers or super-Turing
machines, which have capabilities beyond those of a Turing machine – classical and quantum alike,
the decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation can be made answerable universally, even for
26By contrast, for some elementary (or ‘toy’) systems, for which the expressions for quantum states have been
demonstrated explicitly, taking into account the environment can provide a reliable explanation for the quantum-to-
classical transition (see, for example, paper [32] and review [33]).
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systems whose Hilbert spaces are infinite-dimensional.
For example, one of the hypercomputers called an “infinitely accelerating Turing machine” can
perform infinite amount of elementary operations in a finite amount of time by executing those
operations in infinitely short times [34]. In doing so, the accelerating Turing machine can prove
the statement Πu(HS) for any system S merely by brute force (since in that case a brute force
method would halt in a finite time). This means that super-Turing computability might eliminate
the Heisenberg’s cut by rendering quantum dynamics universal (and the assertion of the existence
of the wave function of the entire universe truthful) even from the constructivist point of view.
However, none of the proposed so far models of hypercomputation seems to be physically con-
structible and reliable. 27 And what is more, any useable physical representation of a Turing-
uncomputable function would imply evidence that the universe is not as we imagine it. For example,
a physical realization of the infinitely accelerating Turing machine would mean that there exist time
intervals shorter than the level of the Planck time widely considered as the scale at which current
physical theories fail.
Therefore, even an allowance for the hypothesis of hypercomputation cannot change the fact that
in the present state of the knowledge the statement Πu(HS) is undecidable for an arbitrary physical
system.
4.3 The many-worlds interpretation
Third, one can argue that the applicableness of quantum mechanics should rely not on the con-
structibility (computability) of its mathematical entities, but rather on the elegance of its first
principles. Along these lines, it is unimportant whether or not the quantum states could be actu-
ally computed because their existence is stipulated by the basic principles of quantum theory.
For instance, the MWI theory (also referred to as the many-worlds interpretation) asserts the ob-
jective reality of the wave function of the universe. Accordingly, in this theory the truthfulness of
the existence of the universal wavefunction does not depend on mathematical techniques of solving
the Schro¨dinger equation for the universe but simply follows from the postulate. As a consequence,
the law of excluded middle is obligatory in the many-worlds interpretation since every statement
about the universal wavefunction – i.e., about the objective reality – must be either true or false.
An argument like this is logically equivalent to the claim that in physics there are experimentally
testable predictions, which are not computable from the data.
Indeed, because in the MWI theory the existence of the universal wave function is accepted without
requiring that it be established by a constructive proof (e.g., computational evidence), it indicates
that this function is not a necessarily computable one [36, 37]. In other words, it is not required
that the universal wave function must be a quantity or an expression obtained by actual calculation
27For details see the paper [35] that discusses the possibility of computation-like processes which transcend the
limits imposed by the Church–Turing hypothesis.
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from the Schro¨dinger equation. On the other hand, the many-worlds interpretation is presented (at
least by its proponents) not as a metaphysical or philosophical conjecture but as a physical theory
which has the ability (or capacity) for testable predictions. So, as follows, this theory accepts
verifiable predictions about the universe that are not computed from the data about the universe,
that is, from the Schro¨dinger equation describing all the physical objects in the universe.
The problem here is not that such uncomputable yet verifiable predictions are not possible. The
problem is that in the MWI theory is not clear when the quantum states can be actually computed
and when they become postulated or, otherwise stated, when the Schro¨dinger equation is a tool
for calculation of physical properties and when it and its solutions turn into utter symbols. Under
the many-worlds interpretation, the Schro¨dinger equation must hold true all the time everywhere.
So, why does the meaning of this equation change?
To be sure, applying the Schro¨dinger equation to the “smallest possible” quantum system con-
sisting of a pair of 1-qubit systems – the microscopic measured system S and the microscopic
“observer” M , one can actually solve the wave equation and prove the existence of the combined
observer–object’s wavefunction (e.g., by explicitly demonstrating it). Clearly, in such a case the
Schro¨dinger equation does not differ much from any other (differential) equations known in physics.
While on the contrary, applying the wave equation to the system comprising the microscopic object
S and the really macroscopic “observer” M (such as the universe), one must postulate the exis-
tence of the combined observer–object’s wavefunction instead of proving it. Evidently, in this case,
the Schro¨dinger equation is no longer a physical equation but just a symbol representing another
symbol – the wavefunction of the universe entangled with the measured system S. So, the question
is, when does the transformation of this equation take place?
Even assuming that one is ready to accept that the Schro¨dinger equation changes its meaning dur-
ing the interaction of S and M (that starts in the microscopic world when the number of degrees
of freedom of the observer M involved in the interaction is still small and goes further into the
macroscopic world involving more and more degrees of freedom of M), hardly such a change can
be portrayed as an “elegance of the first principles”.
4.4 Empiricism of logic
Finally, one may say that decidability (or computability) as a question of the existence of an ef-
fective method for solving a problem is not an attribute or quality of material, physical objects;
therefore, it cannot be a rule or principle of a physical theory. Likewise, assumptions of intuitionistic
logic as a creation of the mind cannot have any connection with foundations of quantum mechanics.
Actually, this is an open question. Theoretically, the principles of logic might be susceptible to
revision on empirical grounds. As it is argued in the celebrated works [38, 39], logic may be em-
pirical, that is, the laws of logic may, or should, be empirically determined. 28
28See also review [40] on the same topic.
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In accordance with this idea, in the present paper the decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation
is symbolized as a logical statement so that the validity of “quantum fundamentalism” (asserting
that we are living in a quantum world or, in other words, that everything in the universe – including
the universe itself – is ultimately describable in quantum-mechanical terms) 29 is provable from this
statement. As it is demonstrated, the law of excluded middle would be applicable to the introduced
statement if and only if quantum fundamentalism held.
On the other hand, because the decision problem of the Schro¨dinger equation is in general undecid-
able, such a statement is allowed to be other than true or false, explicitly, it may fail to have truth
values at all. This provides a compelling case for abandoning the law of excluded middle together
with quantum fundamentalism.
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